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1. Religious Shifts in the Scottish Enlightenment
The eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment was a cultural and 
intellectual movement rooted in Presbyterian soil. The clergy of the Church 
of Scotland were at the forefront of many of its key developments. These 
included leading figures such as William Robertson (1721–93), Thomas Reid 
(1710–96), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Hugh Blair (1718–1800) and George 
Campbell (1719–96). All flourished in the second half of the eighteenth 
century within the ancient universities of Scotland. Their work would not 
have been possible, however, without the significant shifts that had taken 
place in Scottish culture and theology earlier in the century.
After 1700, Scottish theologians began to turn away from the disputes 
that had marked the period of Reformed orthodoxy in the seventeenth 
century. The covenanting period had been succeeded by the Glorious 
Revolution (1689) and Act of Settlement (1701).  The civil strife and violence 
of earlier years had given way to a time of relative Presbyterian stability. 
Greater economic prosperity now appeared to be a consequence of the 
Treaty of Union (1707). At the same time, newer philosophical trends were 
imported from the European continent and England. Increased latitude of 
thought, some of which is quite surprising in its context, became evident in 
the work of several professors. A culture of ‘moderatism’ gradually found 
favour, despite some fierce resistance from the courts of the church. In 
the minds of its exponents, this was integral to a peaceful and prosperous 
society no longer marked by religious intolerance, arcane dogmatic disputes, 
and factionalism. Within this milieu, different intellectual preoccupations 
became widely established. Earlier debates about the extent of the atoning 
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work of Christ, the depravity of the human condition, divine election, and 
the nature of assurance, were displaced by discussion of the innate moral 
sense endowed by the Creator, the nature of virtue, the civilising role of 
the Christian religion, and the sublimity of the teaching of Jesus. All of 
these signalled a confidence in the power of reason which contrasted with 
earlier emphases upon the clouded nature of human judgement and the 
need for divine revelation. Despite these shifts, however, the philosophy 
and religious thought of the period retained a strong Christian theistic cast.1)
Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), Professor of Moral Philosophy in 
Glasgow, was the leading figure of the early Scottish Enlightenment. 
Enjoying the patronage of the Earl of Islay, the most powerful Scottish 
politician of his day, Hutcheson set about transforming the culture of 
the university and the church. Lecturing in English rather than Latin, he 
reached a wide audience by his polished literary style. His Sunday evening 
discourses on the truth of the Christian religion attracted popular audiences. 
While his moral philosophy stressed a natural moral sense, this was traced 
back to the wisdom of the Creator who had endowed us in this way. Owing 
to his intellectual brilliance, gentle disposition, rhetorical skills and political 
acumen, he was largely successful.
Hutcheson also wished to maintain the necessity of religious belief 
for moral motivation. Without belief in the ordering of the world and 
the vindication of our best efforts, we are likely to be undermined and 
demoralised in our projects. (There is a foreshadowing of Kant here.) Belief 
in God, in providence, and in a future state are vital supports for the moral 
agent. These can reassure us in face of anxiety, sustain us when things go 
badly wrong, and secure our perseverance over the long haul. Hutcheson’s 
religion here conforms to what Charles Taylor has aptly called ‘providential 
deism’.2)
1) For further background, see Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of the Scottish 
Enlightenment 1690–1805 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
2) Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 221.
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The so-called Moderate party dominated the Church of Scotland from 
the 1750s until the early nineteenth century. Committed to the principle 
of patronage, by which the landowning classes played a decisive role in 
the appointment of clergy, they represented political and social stability 
through the principles of Enlightenment philosophy and theology. The 
sermon was a key instrument in the promotion of this culture. Instead of 
long ex tempore discourses on the points of Reformed doctrine, preaching 
was characterised by a more polished style, a carefully crafted text, and 
apologetic arguments with a stress on moral principles. The theological 
emphasis of Moderate preaching rested upon the wisdom of the Creator, 
the teaching of Jesus, the providential ordering of nature and history, and 
the prospect of eschatological rewards and punishments.3) 
The influence of classical culture permeated this movement. The 
teaching of rhetorical style was mediated through classical figures such 
as Aristotle. Of particular philosophical significance were the works of the 
Stoics, especially Marcus Aurelius, Cicero and Epictetus. The resonance of 
Stoicism with the ‘providential deism’ of the Enlightenment ensured that 
some of its key tenets would be transposed into eighteenth-century terms 
(Harris 2010). It points to the possibility of a measure of natural goodness 
that counteracts an excessively negative (Calvinist) estimate of our fallen 
nature. 
It is somewhat ironical that the most distinguished figure of the Scottish 
Enlightenment was also its most avowedly sceptical. David Hume (1710–76) 
offered an account of ethics that was wholly independent of religious belief 
or practice. For Hume, our moral passions are rooted in our natural and 
social constitution and require no explanation beyond these. Religion, by 
contrast, can interfere with these by a surfeit of superstition and enthusiasm. 
These are the enemies of social stability and require to be tamed by 
appropriate political arrangements. Our intuitive sense of moral objectivity 
3) Stewart J. Brown, ‘Moderate Theology and Preaching c1750–1800’ in David 
Fergusson and Mark Elliott (eds.), The History of Scottish Theology, Vol. 2 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 69–83.
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is to be explained by our propensity ‘to stain and gild the world with the 
colours of the mind.’4) The language of moral objectivity is a projection 
on to the world of virtues that are either natural to our constitution or 
contrivances to promote our social well-being. This is especially evident 
in his discussion of justice as an artificial virtue. Morality does not require 
religious explanation or underpinning. We can live well, often better, 
without the constraints of religious dogma. 
2. Hutcheson and Smith
Hutcheson was Adam Smith’s (1723–90) teacher and his predecessor in 
the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. Some lines of comparison 
may enable us to appreciate the similarities and differences. Hutcheson’s 
ethical theory sets the context for much of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(TMS), first published in 1759, with its stress on our moral feelings. Drawing 
on the analogy of aesthetic judgements, Hutcheson argues that moral 
approbation reposes upon a sense of what is pleasing in human conduct. In 
particular, the feeling of benevolence plays a central role in the ethical life. 
It ‘recommends the generous part by an immediate undefinable perception’ 
without regard to our own interests.5) The tendency in Hutcheson is to 
regard moral sense as a particular faculty with which human beings have 
been endowed. Though this may be deficient in some persons, just as 
general perceptual capacities can be impaired, it is a universal capacity. A 
pervasive assumption in Hutcheson is that this has been implanted by the 
Creator. Hence, despite the concerns of his conservative ecclesiastical critics 
who feared that Hutcheson attributed too much to our natural capacities, 
there is a close link in his thought between ethics and religion. Nature, 
including its human elements, has been providentially designed by God 
to further our well being. The design argument rehearsed by Hutcheson 
4) David Hume in L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Appendix One, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 294.
5) Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy: In Three Books (London: 
1755), I.4.xii.
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stresses not only the harmonies of the solar system and the fruitfulness of 
the earth, but also the intellectual, moral and spiritual constitution of human 
beings. And these reflections lead him to argue both for the metaphysical 
and moral attributes of God. His system might be described as a species 
of theological naturalism. Our moral capacities are rooted in our human 
nature with its inherent dispositions. But these provide powerful evidence 
of the wisdom and goodness of our Creator. This also leads Hutcheson 
to stress the importance of piety for the sake both of glorifying God and 
reinforcing our ethical commitments. We should reflect upon the attributes 
of God. These are worthy of contemplation and enhance the moral sense. 
And, through participating in public worship, we give outward expression 
to this and become bound with others in the pursuit of common moral and 
religious ends. 
A constant regard to God in all our actions and enjoyments, will 
give a new beauty to every virtue, by making it an act of gratitude 
and love to him; and increase our pleasure in every enjoyment, as it 
will appear an evidence of his goodness: it will give a diviner purity 
and simplicity of heart, to conceive all our virtuous dispositions as 
implanted by God in our hearts, and all our beneficent offices as our 
proper work, and the natural duties of that station we hold in his 
universe, and the services we owe to this nobler country.6)
Hutcheson’s theological commitments are everywhere apparent. Though he 
differs from his Reformed predecessors in attributing much more to nature, 
philosophical reason, and our innate goodness, he stands as a formative 
influence for a Moderate theology. In his philosophy, an ethical naturalism 
is allied to doctrines of creation, providence and eschatological rewards. 
When we come to Adam Smith, we find obvious similarities but also 
some significant differences of emphasis. In the opening chapter of TMS, he 
follows Hutcheson’s rejection of ethical egoism, criticising Mandeville for a 
6) Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, I.10.iii.
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restriction of human motives to self-interest. Our natural tendencies include 
a consideration of others without reference to any advantage accrued for 
ourselves. Our ethical judgements are rooted in our natural capacities. Smith 
makes much of the role of sympathy in which we are able to place ourselves 
in the position of other people and to judge accordingly what is proper, 
honourable, just and so forth. The ideal perspective to which we should 
attain is that of the impartial spectator whose judgements provide an exact 
standard for moral evaluation. But greater attention is given by Smith to 
the ways in which the different virtues arise in a range of social contexts 
and are embedded in the forms of human life. Much of TMS is devoted to 
moral psychology with the result that the need to invoke a distinct moral 
sense endowed by the Creator is largely circumvented.
In discussing Hutcheson, Smith acknowledges his debt.7) A rationalist 
approach to ethics cannot provide a full account of moral approbation and 
motivation. We can discriminate and calculate particular rules of morality 
by use of reason, but distinguishing what is right and agreeable from what 
is wrong and disagreeable cannot at the outset be generated by reason. 
This is the domain of sentiment as Hutcheson clearly saw. Only ‘immediate 
sense and feeling’ (ibid.) can render virtue desirable for its own sake. Yet 
Smith also expresses some scepticism around Hutcheson’s invocation 
of a distinctive moral sense that accounts for our moral perception and 
motivation.8) His account both proves too much and too little. In identifying 
a distinctive moral sense to do the heavy lifting in his theory, Hutcheson 
(and other sentimentalists) have named a term which has hitherto been 
obscure in moral philosophy. Why has this only recently been identified, 
Smith asks, if it is so pervasive and deeply rooted in our constitution? 
7) Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (eds.) D.D. Raphael and A. L. 
Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), VII.iii.2.7–9.
8) Daniel Carey, ‘Francis Hutcheson’s Philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment: 
Reception, Reputation and Legacy’ in Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris (eds.) 
Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume 1: Morals, Politics, Art, 
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 36–85.
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Would not other cultures and civilizations have noticed this earlier? Here 
Smith echoes the anxiety that Hutchesonian ethics still has associations 
with an implausible innatism, whereby he invokes a special category in 
the absence of any other explanatory mechanism. At the same time, Smith 
reckons that Hutcheson’s appeal to a moral sense cannot account for the 
diverse range of moral feelings that can variously be expressed in anger, 
elevation, admiration, gratitude etc. By describing the ways in which 
sympathy connects us with the perspective of other agents, we can broaden 
notions of self-interest, pleasure, and pain to accommodate wider social 
dynamics. In particular, the utility or beauty of a system that works well for 
us can be appreciated and promoted. In this way, Hutcheson’s naturalism 
is deepened without recourse to a special moral sense endowed by the 
Creator.
The different directions in which these forms of ethical naturalism 
move might enable us to reflect further on why religion plays a much less 
prominent role in Smith’s moral theory than in Hutcheson’s.  
3. Adam Smith on Religion 
Given his reticence and some of the shifts in his writing, it is not surprising 
that a range of different views has been attributed to him. These include a 
Christian theology that is shared with other moderate thinkers, a theistic 
Stoicism that was increasingly accentuated in his philosophy, and a deep 
scepticism that was much more carefully concealed than that of his close 
friend Hume. Some recent writers including Phillipson9), Kennedy10) and 
Heydt11) have argued that Smith is much more closely aligned with Humean 
9) Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life (London: Allen Lane, 
2010). 
10) Gavin Kennedy, ‘Adam Smith on Religion’, in Christopher J. Berry, Maria 
Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 464–486.  
11) Colin Heydt, ‘The Problem of Natural Religion in Smith’s Moral Thought’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 78.1 (2017), 73–94. For a rejoinder in defence 
of Smith’s theological commitments, see Paul Oslington, ‘The “New View” of 
Adam Smith in Context’, History of Economics Review, 71.1 (2018), 118–131.
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scepticism than with any obviously theistic position. Others have argued for 
a more vigorous if concealed theological underpinning.12)  My own view is 
that Smith retained elements of Moderate theology but that these were not 
of obvious personal or intellectual significance, and that at the very least 
there is some drift in his outlook from the tenets of Christian orthodoxy.13) 
Yet, Smith’s views were well concealed, so much of this debate is conjectural.
Smith’s closest relationship throughout his life was with his mother 
who died in 1784 in her ninetieth year. A devout Presbyterian, she attended 
the Canongate Kirk; together with its manse, it is situated next door to the 
Smith home at Panmure House on Edinburgh’s Royal Mile. Adam Smith 
probably accompanied her to church on many a Sunday. At the time of her 
death, he wrote to his publisher.
Tho’ the death of a person in her ninetieth year of her age was no 
doubt an event most agreeable to the course of nature; and, therefore, 
to be foreseen and prepared for; yet I must say to you, what I have 
to other people, that the final separation from a person who certainly 
loved me more than any other person ever did or ever will love me; 
and whom I certainly loved and respected more than I shall ever love 
or respect any other person, I cannot help feeling, even at this hour, 
as a very heavy stroke upon me.14)
This moving passage tells us only of the mutual affection between a son and 
his mother. As far as indicating Smith’s own theological beliefs it offers us 
12) Jacob Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1972); Lisa Hill, Lisa. ‘The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith’, 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 8:1 (2001), 1–29; Paul 
Oslington, ‘Divine Action, Providence and Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand’, in 
Paul Oslington (ed.), Adam Smith as Theologian(London: Routledge, 2011), 
61–76.
13) For this more mediating position, see Gordon Graham, ‘Adam Smith and 
Religion’ in Ryan Patrick Hanley (ed.), Adam Smith: His Life, Thought and 
Legacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 305–320.
14) Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, 262.
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very little. We have to assume that Smith would have respected his mother’s 
piety and done nothing to disturb it. But the reference to a ‘final separation’ 
does not betoken the absence of a belief in an afterlife. Christians can talk 
of a final parting at death, without implying the lack of hope beyond the 
grave. Smith’s mother can be used neither to confirm nor deny his faith.
His relationship with the dying Hume is also of much interest, though 
again it raises as many questions as it answers. As Hume’s closest friend at 
the close of his life, Smith became his literary executor. Despite being tasked 
with arranging the posthumous publication of the Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, Smith was reluctant to be drawn into a public controversy. 
In the end, the manuscript was entrusted to Hume’s nephew who quickly 
ensured its publication. The effect was not as divisive as Smith had feared. 
Perhaps as reparation for this refusal, Smith instead published a letter to 
his publisher describing the manner of Hume’s death as befitting that of the 
most perfectly wise and virtuous man of his acquaintance. While no traces 
of faith or hope were evident, Hume remained amiable and cheerful to the 
end. Smith remarked to a friend. ‘Poor David Hume is dying very fast, but 
with great cheerfulness and good humour, and with more real resignation to 
the necessary course of things, than any Whining Christian ever dyed with 
pretended resignation to the will of God’.15) These are strong words, but do 
they signify that Smith is in accord with Hume’s agnosticism and merely 
avoided its advocacy on account of his aversion to public controversy? 
Again, the evidence is slender either way, though it is clear that he shared 
Hume’s disdain for the manifestations of religious enthusiasm, intolerance 
and sectarian division.
More significant perhaps are the extensive adjustments to portions of 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments in the sixth and final edition of 1789. The 
best-known deletion is the passage on the atonement in which an extended 
reference to the standard Reformed understanding of the atoning work of 
Christ’s death is replaced by reference to a universal religious conviction 
regarding future rewards and punishments. ‘In every religion, and in every 
15) Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, 244. 
62
superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a 
Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the 
wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just’16). Smith’s emendation 
undoubtedly suggests a departure from a more orthodox theological 
position. But it remains consistent with much of the regnant moderate 
theology of the day which maintained a system of eschatological rewards 
and punishments while typically presenting Christ as a moral teacher and 
exemplar. Smith appears to distance himself from Christian theories of 
atonement, but not necessarily from all forms of ‘providential deism’.
The critical remarks about religion in the Wealth of Nations (WN) are 
also taken to signify this more sceptical attitude to religion.17) Like Hume, 
Smith is suspicious of religious groups that dominate society to the extent 
of repressing and persecuting opposition. Both Roman Catholics and 
Protestants are subject to this criticism at different historical moments. 
Smith’s preferred option is for a balancing of smaller sects, none of which 
can then dominate civic life. These will tend to respect other groups and 
co-exist in the same social space – hence his preference for an American 
model of church-state relations by contrast with Hume’s preference for a 
benign establishment. As Kennedy notes, competition is Smith’s preferred 
solution for religious and as well as commercial monopolies.18) And he 
appears to favour Presbyterianism over Episcopacy as a form of church 
government, owing to its distribution of power and authority.19) Yet Smith 
also notes some tendency towards narrow-mindedness and an over-bearing 
moral rigour amongst the sects. This can be counteracted, he judges, by 
the study of science and philosophy and in ‘the frequency and gaiety of 
16) TMS II.ii.3.12.
17) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
(eds.) R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1981), V.i.iii.
18) Kennedy, ‘Adam Smith on Religion’, 471–472.
19) Kennedy, ‘Adam Smith on Religion’, 473; Gordon Graham, ‘Adam Smith and 
Religion’, 316.
Adam Smith on Ethics and Religion 63
publick diversions’.20) Yet there is little here from which moderate theology 
would dissent. 
I doubt that we can find a window into Smith’s soul at any point in 
his literary output. Some diminution of his Christian convictions seems 
apparent, though perhaps this is the older man becoming less constrained 
by public opinion and the need for approbation. Or maybe Smith, like so 
many of us, was a man of fluctuating and uncertain theological opinions. 
The direction of travel may incline towards scepticism on key Christian 
tenets, even while much of the framework of his ethical philosophy 
strongly suggests something like a providential deism. Though Heydt 
argues persuasively for a strong naturalism of conscience in Smith and 
a ‘psychological genealogy’ of religious belief, there remain too many 
passages in Smith that seem to invoke religious belief and practice as 
important for ethics. Are we to believe that Smith is really dissembling 
here for the sake of conformity and a temperamental reluctance to engage 
in public controversy, especially as many of these passages survive his late-
life revisions? Admittedly, the absence of ‘piety’ from his list of virtues is 
strikingly egregious in an eighteenth-century Scottish context, but again 
this may reflect a more minimalist natural religion animated by a growing 
scepticism about positive religion and its ‘whining’ practitioners. There 
are many people who have given up on the church and the conventions of 
religious practice without abandoning their belief in God. Smith may be 
numbered amongst them.
The references to providence in TMS III.V are generally positive, strong 
and in accordance with Stoic philosophy. There is an order of nature, 
governing the world and human affairs. Our duty is to assent to this and 
to accept its conditions. The dictates of duty are presented to us as the will 
of God. Belief in God reinforces our moral motivation and performance. 
The tenor of Smith’s writing is shaped in part by his reading of Seneca, 
Zeno and Epictetus on the subject of divine providence. This represents 
a theory of general providence, rather than the special providence that is 
20) WN, V.i.iii.
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also a constitutive feature of Reformed theology. Smith’s invocation of a 
standard of ‘exact propriety and perfection’ to which our human norms 
can only approximate has some religious possibilities. The notion of an 
‘archetype of perfection’ produced by a ‘divine artist’ enables us to make a 
distinction between what is generally approved in society with what ought 
to be approved, even if these can never be entirely separated.21) One might 
argue that the providentialist categories that shape Smith’s philosophy 
lean in a theistic direction – it seems possible to develop elements of TMS 
in this way. And yet Smith never makes the same moves that we find in 
Hutcheson. There is no explicit attempt to use ethics, economic order, or the 
domain of nature as evidence for the divine existence. Although he notes 
the efficacy of religious images for our moral performance, everything he 
says is consistent with theological non-cognitivism. To view belief in God as 
helpful for moral purposes does not constitute an argument for the veracity 
of such belief. Smith does not go there at any point in his philosophy. The 
possibility remains open for others to make the necessary argumentative 
moves, as many of his successors did. And yet, Smith says little that cannot 
be accommodated by an exhaustive naturalism.22)
The evidence from his library, moreover, suggests that Smith had little 
interest in theological issues.23) There is no sign of any important work of 
European Protestant theology – Calvin, Bullinger, and the Puritans do not 
21) TMS VI.iii.25.
22) In my view, Smith’s occasional references to an ‘invisible hand’ incline towards 
a more naturalist reading. Although he would be fully aware of the theological 
associations of this metaphor, he uses it infrequently and never develops 
it along familiar theological lines. It is more easily read as a description of 
natural effects. While one might readily locate this within a theory of general 
providence, Smith offers little encouragement to do so. But for an excellent 
discussion of the provenance of the notion and a stronger reading than the one 
I offer, see Peter Harrison, ‘Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible Hand’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 72.1 (2011), 29–49. This reading is also preferred 
by Paul Oslington, ‘God and the Market: Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand’, Journal 
of Business Ethics, 108.4 (2012), 429–438.
23) See Hiroshi Mizuta, Adam Smith’s Library: A Catalogue (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000).
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feature. Nor do we find much in the way of eighteenth-century apologetic 
works such as Joseph Butler’s Analogy or George Campbell’s Dissertation on 
Miracles. While of course Hutcheson and Hume feature prominently, the 
exponents of the Protestant faith of his native land are largely conspicuous 
by their absence. It is almost as if Smith’s library had been purged of all such 
work. It is difficult to avoid the impression of a deep ambivalence around 
the Christian religion in Smith, perhaps confirmed by the sense amongst 
his some of his contemporaries that he was not quite sound. Philippson 
quotes an anonymous writer in 1791. ‘In many respects, Adam Smith was 
a chaste disciple of Epicurus, as that philosopher is properly understood… 
O venerable, amiable, and worthy man, why was you not a Christian?’24) 
4. Further Problems of Smith Interpretation
How might these comments impact upon the wider issues in the 
interpretation of Smith? In conclusion, I raise three of these to assess how 
this ethical context might be relevant for his economics 
i) ‘Das Adam Smith-Problem’ emerged in nineteenth-century Germany 
as a problem about the mismatch of his two key texts – The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations.25) In discussing the human agent in 
these works, commentators remarked upon the sympathetic moral agent 
of TMS against the acquisitive homo economicus of WN. The dutiful and 
benevolent person of the earlier work seemed to be displaced by the self-
centred and wealth-seeking individual of the market place. This is best 
illustrated in the famous passage: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest’.26) According to some commentators, 
this apparent shift in perspective was to be explained by a sudden turn in 
24) Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, 281. 
25) W. von Skarżyński, Adam Smith als Moralphilosoph und Schoepfer der 
Nationaloekonomie: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nationaloekonomie (Berlin: 
Verlag von Theobold Grieben, 1878); Keith Tribe, The Economy of the Word: 
Language, History and Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
26) WN1.ii.2.
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Smith’s thought towards a French materialism in which he abandoned the 
religious and Stoic orientation of his earlier work. But this hypothesis of 
‘two Smiths’ is now widely rejected. This problem can readily be resolved 
without resort to such a radical hypothesis. Although the focus of TMS is 
on moral agency and the character of sympathy, Smith nowhere denies that 
self-love is an important motive of conduct. Indeed, he spends time extolling 
the importance of prudence, industry and frugality, all of which are entirely 
consistent with WN. And, in writing a treatise on economics, it is not in 
the least surprising that the focus falls on the self-interest of the agent. 
But he nowhere denies that the same agent is sociable, capable of fellow-
feeling or alert to the claims of justice. His account of sympathy is intended 
precisely to show the continuities between self-love and love of the other.27) 
As Raphael notes in his introduction to TMS, Smith himself provides the 
strongest argument against the problem. He revised TMS shortly before 
his death and did so in a way that clearly signalled its consistency with 
the claims of WN. The providentially ordered society that Smith described 
was one in which self-love played its part alongside other motives for 
action. Love of self and love of neighbour were not mutually exclusive but 
correlative, even if obvious tensions could persist between these springs of 
conduct. But these are held together in Smith’s account of the regulated life 
in which different virtues and practices are properly ordered. 
ii) The question of Smith’s allegiance to laissez-faire economics has long 
divided commentators. The ‘problem’ for German commentators arose 
from their scepticism about whether the pursuit of individual economic 
interests would result naturally in the promotion of the general good. But 
was this really the view of Smith himself? Certainly, in much nineteenth-
century British economic thought, a confidence in market forces was upheld 
to the extent that interference with these could even be perceived to be 
against the will of God. Some passages in Smith obviously incline in this 
27) Alexander Broadie, ‘Sympathy and the Impersonal Spectator ’, in Knud 
Haakonssen (ed.) Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 158–188.
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direction, particularly those that refer to an ‘invisible hand’, though these 
are infrequent.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention… By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.28)
Theological appropriations of this language are not difficult to find, 
particularly in the nineteenth century. An exponent of free trade, Thomas 
Chalmers insisted that the economic order was ordained by divine 
providence; if respected, it would prove benevolent in its outcomes.29) The 
internal order of the system constrains us to develop Christian virtues, 
thus demonstrating its providential worth. Other considerations were 
also advanced by evangelical economists, including the thought that a 
population surfeit amidst scarce resources would encourage emigration 
and so the spread of the gospel to distant places. State intervention through 
the Poor Laws was correspondingly criticised as destructive inter alia of 
personal initiative, philanthropic endeavour, and family-ties.
But whether this reflects Smith’s own position is doubtful. Free trade 
was undoubtedly perceived as an activity that brought many benefits to 
individuals and society. Yet Smith did not regard unbridled free trade as 
a universal panacea.  In this regard, he recognised the limitations of the 
market and the need for state regulation and selective intervention. This 
applies for example to the regulation of interest rates where the maximum 
28) WN IV.2.9.
29) Boyd Hilton, ‘Chalmers as Political Economist’, in A. C. Cheyne (ed.), The 
Practical and the Pious: Essays on Thomas Chalmers (1780–1847), Edinburgh: St 
Andrew Press, 1985), 141–156.ilHik
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legal permitted should be set ‘a little above’ the market rate. According to 
Smith, capping the interest rate ensures a more generally advantageous use 
of capital while also constraining those actions of ‘prodigals and projectors’ 
which damage the system and bring it into disrepute.30) Furthermore, 
the aims of political economy are not only to ensure the subsistence of a 
people but also to enable the provision of public services by the state. For 
Smith, this included poor relief, the provision of free education and the 
improvement of transport infrastructure. The case for free trade, therefore, 
did not hinge upon a defence of a radical laissez-faire approach. A strong 
sense of the common good, the welfare of all, and the role of civic bodies 
and the state in promoting these informs his work, as one would expect 
given his moral philosophy. His economic theory is set within the wider 
context of an account of the human condition, society and the order of 
nature. An account of human flourishing informs his work – we should not 
set his writings on political economy apart from this. 
iii) The question whether Smith was optimistic or pessimistic about the 
outcomes for political economy has also received contradictory answers.31) 
Excessive appeal to the ‘invisible hand’ passages might suggest that social 
and economic progress is inevitable over the course of time. If there is 
an inherent order in the cosmos to which we are bound, then this might 
be expected to prevail in ways that are providential. The ends of nature 
– self-preservation, procreation, and happiness – best prevail in a free 
trading, commercial society. Here much of Smith’s work resonated with 
the optimistic spirit of the following century. Yet against this there are many 
more cautionary and sombre elements in his work. Commercial society is 
neither inevitable nor permanent, and even where it flourishes it does so 
amidst conflict and tension. Class envy, excessive materialism, manipulation 
of government by powerful elites, and the urge to dominate other peoples 
30) See Amartya Sen, ‘The Contemporary Relevance of Adam Smith’, in Christopher 
J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 582.
31) James Alvey, Adam Smith: Optimist or Pessimist (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
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– all these forces and problems threaten the telos of a commercial society. 
Given the textual evidence for both positions, this tension in Smith seems 
unresolved. It is inherent rather than apparent. He remains a ‘sober optimist’ 
or a ‘hopeful pessimist’ held captive by the different tendencies in his 
thought. But, in this respect at least, he may be regarded as belonging to the 
religious ethos of moderate Scotland and its Protestant realism about human 
nature. Confident of economic and social progress, it had moved beyond 
the religious violence, impoverishment and intolerance of the seventeenth 
century. Yet the Reformed theological tradition, with its sombre estimate 
of human capacities, continued to exercise a refracted influence amongst 
the Moderates. In this intellectual setting, Smith’s ambivalent approach to 
human nature, society and religion makes good sense. 
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The thought of Adam Smith (1723–90) can be positioned within the 
‘Moderate’ culture that dominated Scottish intellectual life in the mid-
eighteenth century. By viewing his Theory of Moral Sentiments against the 
background of Francis Hutcheson’s earlier moral philosophy, we can discern 
both continuity and change. Smith emerges as a more thoroughgoing 
naturalist in both his interests and convictions. Although he writes 
positively of religion in places, it is difficult to determine his own views. In 
surveying the evidence, this essay inclines towards a minimalist account of 
Smith’s religious commitments which probably belong at the more sceptical 
end of the deist spectrum. It concludes by seeking to expose several myths 
concerning Smith’s outlook – these can be dispelled by attention to the 
intellectual background and general consistency of his two major works.
